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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PATRICK R. DONAHUE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

CASE NO. 890454

JOHN C. DURFEE; DELTA VALLEY
FOODS, a Utah corporation;
LARRY HOWELL; UTAH POWER &
LIGHT COMPANY, a Utah
corporation; and ABCO
CONSTRUCTION CORP., a Utah
corporation,

PRIORITY 13

Defendants/Respondents
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT PATRICK DONAHUE'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT HOWELL'S PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review
the Court of Appeals decision holding that the "open and
obvious danger" rule, applied as an absolute bar to recovery,
is anachronistic and inappropriate in light of the adoption and
application of Utah's comparative negligence scheme?
REPORT OF OPINION
The subject decision has been published in 118 Utah
Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. filed September 28, 1989); slip op. No.
8800227-CA.

JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on
September 28, 1989.

Plaintiff/appellant Donahue does not

dispute the Court's jurisdiction to review the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1973)r1
Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for
negligence or gross negligence resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if
such negligence was not as great as the
negligence or gross negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the
proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering. As
used in this act, "contributory negligence"
includes "assumption of the risk."
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1973):l
The court may, and when requested by
any party shall, direct the jury to find
separate special verdicts determining
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and
(2) the percentage of negligence
attributable to each party; and the court
shall then reduce the amount of the damages
in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person seeking recovery.

1

The controlling provisions of law are stated as enacted at
the time of plaintiff's injuries. These provisions have since
been repealed and reenacted in a manner which eliminated joint
and several liability but which does not otherwise alter the
rationale urged by Donahue or adopted by the Court of Appeals.
See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 and 38 (1986).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Delta
Valley Foods (DVF), John C. Durfee, Larry Howell, ABCO
Construction Corp. and Utah Power & Light 2 for injuries
suffered when he came in contact with a 7200-volt high-tension
power line in the course of his employment installing a rain
gutter on DVF' s warehouse.

The District Court entered summary

judgment in favor of DVF, Durfee and Howell, concluding that
the power line constituted an open and obvious danger and,
accordingly, that these defendants owed no duty to Donahue.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the application of
the open and obvious danger rule, resulting in an absolute bar
to recovery, was inappropriate and inconsistent with the
Comparative Negligence Act.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Donahue was injured on August 18, 1982 when, while
installing rain gutter on DVF's warehouse, he came in contact
with a 7200-volt power line which crossed over the warehouse
construction site just a few feet above the building's
rooftop.

(R. 3-5; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.)

As a result of

the electrocution, Donahue fell from the roof approximately 25
to 30 feet to the ground.

Donahue sustained both

electrocution- and fall-related injuries.

2

Id.

Plaintiff has settled with Utah Power & Light and ABCO;
consequently they are not parties to this appeal.
5236 j
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Defendant Larry Howell, a steel building salesman, had
been hired by DVF, through its general manager, defendant
Durfee, to arrange the construction of the warehouse.
pp. 26-28, 31-33, 39-41; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.)

(R. 663,
Howell

procured the necessary building materials and arranged for a
contractor, ABCO Construction Corporation, to erect the
warehouse.

(R. 663, pp. 64-65; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.)

Near the completion of the warehouse erection, Donahue's
employer, Mr. Rain Gutter, was retained to install guttering to
promote appropriate water drainage from the roof.

Id.

As noted above, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of DVF, Durfee and Howell on the basis that
they owed no duty to warn Donahue or otherwise protect him from
the power line, as it constituted an open and obvious danger.
(118 Utah Adv. Rep. 65.)

The Court of Appeals reversed,

determining that the open and obvious danger rule was an
anachronism in the context of Utah's comparative negligence
statute.

(118 Utah Adv. Rep. 67). Defendant Howell now seeks

a writ of certiorari to this Court.
ARGUMENT
Defendant Howell contends that the Court of Appeals
decision is contrary to this Court's decision in Ellertson v.
Dansie. 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978).

In actuality, the Ellertson

court did not state that the open and obvious danger rule

5236 j
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removed any duty on the part of the possessor of land.

Rather,

the court stated that "[wjhere there is a dangerous condition
on one's property, which is just as observable to an invitee as
to the owner, the owner has no duty to warn or to protect the
invitee except to observe the universal standard of reasonable
care under the circumstances."
added; footnote omitted).

576 P.2d at 868 (emphasis

Although ambiguous, that language

suggests that rather than having no duty at all, the duty is
that suggested by appellant herein and the Court of Appeals
below, that of reasonable care under the circumstances.
Further, a careful reading of the Ellertson case
reveals that the decision was based not on the presence or
absence of a duty, but on the issue of proximate cause.

The

court held that the plaintiff's conduct was "a later occurring,
independent and intervening cause of his injury," and that
there was

%t

no basis upon which it could reasonably be found

that any negligence on the part of the defendants was a_
proximate cause thereof."

Id. (emphasis added).

That the

court's decision turned on proximate cause rather than duty is
confirmed in the concluding paragraph, where the court stated
". . . w e are not persuaded to disagree with the determination
made by the trial court that there is no basis upon which it
could be shown that any negligence of the defendants was a

5236 j
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direct, or immediate, or proximate, cause of the plaintiff's
injury."

Id.
Reference to the open and obvious danger rule

generally relates back to Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-4 (1964), where
the court stated: "Where the hazardous condition is as easily
observable to the invitee as to the owner, the duty to warn
does not exist . . . ."

Id. at 753.

However, that case was

decided under the contributory negligence system, where any
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
regardless of how great or slight, served as a complete bar to
plaintiff's recovery.

As the Court of Appeals in this case

noted, under a contributory negligence scheme it made little
difference whether a known or obvious condition excused a land
possessor's duty or simply insulated the possessor from
liability for any breach of that duty.

Donahue v. Durfee, 118

Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 66, citing Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105
Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1118-19 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on
other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984).
However, Utah has now abandoned its contributory
negligence system in favor of a comparative negligence system,
118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66; Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1973 and
1987).

Interpreting the open and obvious danger rule to

obviate a landowner's duty effectively resurrects the complete

5236 j
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bar to recovery sought to be alleviated by the adoption of a
comparative negligence system.

Just as this Court has declined

to retain "all or nothing" doctrines such as assumption of the
risk, last clear chance and discovered peril, see, Dixon v.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), and Moore v. Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 871 (Utah 1981); see also,
Donahue, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67, so the Court of Appeals
correctly determined that the open and obvious danger rule
should not be retained as an absolute bar to recovery.
While there is language in Moore suggesting that there
is no duty to warn of an obvious danger, 631 P.2d 868, the
court in Moore was not required to address this issue since it
determined that the hazard was not obvious.

Id.

As the Court

of Appeals noted below, had the court in Moore addressed the
issue, it almost certainly would have determined that there
were no significant differences between the open and obvious
danger rule and the assumption of risk doctrine which the court
there abandoned; had it considered both it likely would have
abandoned both under the comparative negligence system.

See

Donahue, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68, n.3.
The Court of Appeals decision below is correct, well
reasoned, and consistent with the direct holdings of this Court
issued since the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act.
Since the Court of Appeals decision is correct and appropriate,

5236 j
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and is consistent with the status of the law since the adoption
of the Comparative Negligence Act, it is unnecessary to grant
certiorari in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals decision is correct and well
reasoned and should not be disturbed.

Defendant Howell's

petition for writ of certiorari should be denied and the case
permitted to return to the District Court for further
disposition without additional delay.
Dated this 30th day of November, 1989,
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX
St BENDINGER
W. Brent Wilcox (A3464)
Edward B. fiavas (A1425)
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 30th day of November, 1989, four true copies
of the foregoing Opposition to Petition for Certiorari were
sent by first-class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid to
Robert B. Hansen, Esq.
838 - 18th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Darwin C. Hansen, Esq.
110 West Center
Bountiful, Utah 84101
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DARWIN C. HANSEN, #2058
Attorney for Defendants Durfee and
Delta Valley- Foods
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone*: (801) 295-2391
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
i-ATRICK R. DONAHUE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation; JOHN C.
DURFEE, DELTA VALLEY FOODS,
a Utah corporation; LARRY
HOWELL, ABCO CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation

AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS
JOHN C. DURFEE AND DELTA
VALLEY FOODS

Defendants.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C84-4449

vs.
SANDY CITY CORPORATION, EUGENE
STRICKLAND and DARRELL MARTIN,

Honorable Pat B. Brian

Third-Party Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on Wednesday, the 14th day of October, 1987,
pursuant to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants John
C. Durfee and Delta Valley Foods, a Utah corporation,

herein

APPENDIX 1

BEC

o 7 war

jointly

referred

to as

judge, presiding.

"Durfee", the Honorable

Pat B. Brian,

All parties appeared through their respective

counsel of record.

Counsel for Durfee argued the Motion which

was responded to by counsel for Plaintiff.

The Court, having

reviewed the file, considered oral argument, and now being fully
advised in the premises, makes and enters its uncontroverted:
FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACT
Plaintiff was aware of the power lines above Durfeefs

1.
building.
2.

Plaintiff

knew

that

the

power

lines

were

extremely

dangerous and could cause severe injuries if touched.
3. Plaintiff had learned about electricity in school and on
the job.
4.

The risk of harm from the power lines was obvious to

Plaintiff.
5.

Plaintiff's employer was warned of the power lines by

Durfee on the day of the accident when he pointed to the lines
and said:
"I don't know anything about electricity, but
if it were me, I don't think I would climb up
on that ladder."
6. Plaintiff was warned by his employer to be careful and
not touch the wires.
7. Plaintiff warned a fellow employee of the dangers of the
lines.
From the foregoing Findings of Material
makes and enters its:

Fact, the

Court

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff was an invitee on Durfee 1 s property.

2.

The power lines constituted an obvious danger of which

Plaintiff was aware.
3.

Durfee had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the obvious

power line danger.
- 2 -

4.

If such a duty existed, it was discharged when Durfee

warned Plaintifffs employer.
From the foregoing Findings of Uncontroverted Material Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the Court makes and enters its Judgment,
as follows:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Durfee is
granted a "No Cause of-Action" Judgment against Plaintiff,
together with costs•
DATED this
\2^
day of November, 1987.
BY THE COURT:
"

(7
FAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT JUDGE
::> \
H. D I A O N H I M D L E Y

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

^ 7 >

CLERK/r

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 6f^>therk
foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND O R D E R C GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS JOHN C. DURFEE AND DELTA VALLEY
FOODS, to the following-n^ntj^U individual via first-class mail,
<5p
postage prepaid on this
^^aay of October, 1987:
Paul H. Proctor, Esq.
Utah Power & Light Company
P. 0. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
R. Scott Williams, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth* Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney at Law
320 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

W. Brent Wilcox, Esq.
Giauque & Williams
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Randall E. Grant, Esq.
Grant & Grant
340 South Second East, Suite 410
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

w^-

- 4 -

Robert B. Hansen A-1344
Attorney for Defendant, Larry Howell
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 322-5804

i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PATRICK C. DONAHUE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, JOHN C.
DURFEE, DELTA VALLEY FOODS,
a Utah Corporation, LARRY HOWELL,
ABCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,

:

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
LARRY HOWELL

:
:

Defendants.

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

:

Civil No. C84-4449

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

SANDY CITY CORPORATION, EUGENE
STRICKLAND, and DARRELL MARTIN,
Third-Party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on Wednesday, the 14th day of October, 1987,
pursuant to Mbtion for Summary Judgement filed by Defendant Larry
Howell, the Honorable PAT B, BRIAN, judge presiding.

All parties

appeared through their respective counsel of record.

Counsel of

APPENDIX 2

Howell argued the Motion which was responded to by counsel for
Plaintiff.

The Court, having reviewed the file, considered oral

argument, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes and
enters its uncontroverted:
FINDINGS £F MATERIAL FACT
1.

The subject power lines constituted an open, obvious,

and plain-to-be-seen danger of which Plaintiff was fully aware.
2.

Plaintiff was adequately warned of the power line danger

through his employer Eugene Strickland.
From the foregoing Findings of Material Fact, the Court
enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Howell's Motion for summary Judgment should be granted as a
matter of law because:
1.

Howell had no duty running in favor of Plaintiff in that

the subject power lines constituted an open arid obvious hazard; and
2.

In the alternative, even if the power lines did not

constitute an open and obvious hazard, Plaintiff was adequately
warned of the danger by his employer Eugene Strickland.
From the foregoing Findings of [Incontroverted Material Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the Court makes and enters its Order, as
follows:

ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Howell is
granted a "no cause of action" judgment against Plaintiff, together
with costs.
Dated this

/ j)

day of December, 1987.
BY THE COURT

/
-^.
PAT B. BRIAN
District Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE

J

-r

.-4„.

zv.

\ _^T^Ol(Ja^

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings, Conclusions and Order Granting Summary Judgment
to Defendant Howell, to the following-named individual by first-class
mail, postage prepaid on this

2.**«f day of December, 1987.

Paul H. Proctor,
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
R. Scott Williams
Attorney at Law
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Darwin C. Hansen
Attorney at Law
110 West Center Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
W. Brent Wilcox
Attorney at Law
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

r^? ^ L /

Robert B. Hansen

Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Baird

CODE•CO
Provo. Utah
118lJtafa Adv Rep. 57
15. See generally In re Independent Clearing House
Cite as
Co., 77 Bankr. 843, 868 (D. Utah 1987); United
118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64
States v. Gleneagies Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574
(D. Pa. 1983); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N J . 397, 189
A.2d 15, 20 (1963). See also Comment, Good Faith
IN THE
and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
(1983).
16. Although transactions between family members Patrick R. DONAHUE,
do not, by themselves, render a transaction fraudPlaintiff and Appellant,
ulent, Utah courts, nonetheless, have often declared
v.
that the transactions must be closely scrutinized. See,
e.g., Wed J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d John C. DURFEE; Delta Valley Foods, a
173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962); Civan v. Lambeth, Utah corporation; Larry Howell; Utah Power
10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P 2d 959, 962 (1960); Paxron v. & Light Company, a Utah corporation; ABCO
Paxron, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051,1056 (1932).
Construction Corp., a Utah corporation,
17. Cf. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P 2d
Defendants and Respondents.
956, 957 (Utah 1987) (issues deemed tried by consent
of the parties); Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Wick No. 880227-CA
Constr. Co., 680 P 2d 1100, 1103 n.l (Ak. 1984) FILED: September 28, 1989
(findings and conclusions demonstrate the issues
were litigated); Quilhn v Hesston Corp., 230 Kan.
591, 640 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1982) (issue was consid- Third District, Salt Lake County
ered by trial court even though not specifically Honorable Pat B. Brian
raised by the parties).
ATTORNEYS.
18. See Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423. 519 P 2d
236, 239 (1974); In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 379- W. Brent Wilcox and Edward B. Havas, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
83 (D. Utah 1981). See also Koch Eng'g Co. v.
Faulconer, 239 Kan. 101, 716 P.2d 180, 185 (1986). Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for
Once again, as one of its principal arguments on
Respondents John C. Durfee and Delta
appeal, TSL contends that the trial court improperly
Valley Foods
allocated the parties' respective burdens of proof.
TSL claims that a plaintiff may create a presump- Robert B. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for
tion of fraudulent intent by establishing the presence
Respondent Larry Howell
of badges of fraud. Once this occurs, TSL asserts Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
that the defendant then bears the burden of proof to
rebut such a presumption. Although it is arguably a
OPINION
matter of semantics, we find the more accurate terminology is that once a plaintiff establishes by circumstantial evidence or otherwise, an inference that ORME, Judge:
the defendant harbored actual intent to defraud, the
Plaintiff Patrick Donahue appeals the distburden of coming forward with rebuttal evidence, rict court's entry of summary judgment in
not the burden of proof, shifts to the defendant. Com- favor of defendants Delta Valley Foods
pare Koch, 716 P 2d at 186, with In re ("DVF"), j [ Durfee, and Larry Howell.
0 m
Grooms, 13 Bankr. at 383.
Donahue
filed
this negligence action seeking to
19. See, e.g., Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P 2d 835, 838
(Ak. 1986); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stoller, 221 recover damages for injuries he suffered when
Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630 (1986) (provided by he contacted an electrical power line while
installing a rain gutter on DVF's warehouse.
statute).
20. Dahnken Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmanh, The district court concluded the power line
726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) (quoting Givan v. constituted an open and obvious danger and,
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 962 accordingly, DVF, Durfee, and Howell owed
(I960)). See also Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 no duty to warn Donahue of the danger or
P.2d 1063, 1065 (1942).
otherwise protect him from it. We reverse and
21. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Michels, 631 P 2d 1260, remand.
1263 (Mont. 1981)(quoting Humbird v. Arnet, 99
Mont. 499, 44 P 2d 756, 761 (1935)).
FACTS
22. Id. (citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent ConveySummary judgment is proper only where
ances §10 at 701 (1968)). See also Gabaig v, "there is no genuine issue as to any material
Gabaig, 1\1 P.2d 835, 839 (Ak. 1986); Koch, 716
P 2d at 184; Moms v. Holland, 529 S.W 2d 948, fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a
953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Gifford-Hill <fe Co. v. judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ, P.
56(c). "In reviewing a summary judgment, we
Stoller, 221 Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630(1986).
23. Cf. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar.analyze the facts and inferences in a light most
Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d favorable to the losing party." Copper State
685, 688 (1965); Conder v. A.L. Williams <k Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture
Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah Ct. App. Co., 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
1987) (both cases reverse summary judgments in Accordingly, we set forth the facts as contefraud cases on the basis of material issues of fact).
nded by Donahue.
John Durfee, DVF's general manager, hired
Larry Howell, a steel building salesman, to
organize the construction of a new warehouse

64

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

APPENDIX 3

C O D E • CO
Provo. Utah

Donahue v. Duriee
118 Utah Adv. Rep. 64

for DVF. Howell's duties included procuring
the necessary building materials and locating a
suitable contractor. With Durfee's consent,
Howell hired ABCO Construction Corp. to
erect the warehouse.
By spring of 1982, the warehouse was
mostly complete and Howell hired "Mr. Rain
Gutter," Donahue's employer, to install a
gutter to promote proper water drainage. On
August 18, 1982, Donahue was assigned to
assist with the DVF warehouse project.
Donahue was required to work from atop the
warehouse roof, where a 7200 volt hightension power line operated by Utah Power
and Light loomed approximately four to five
feet overhead. Apparently, Donahue stood up
during the gutter's installation and the top of
his head struck the power line, causing a
severe electrical shock and his resulting fall
from the warehouse roof. Donahue was not
warned about the powerline but saw it and
perceived the potentially fatal danger which it
posed.
In July of 1984, Donahue brought this
negligence action against DVF, Durfee,
Howell, ABCO, and Utah Power and Light.1
DVF, Durfee, and Howell moved for
summary judgment, contending they owed no
duty to warn Donahue or otherwise protect
him from the power line as it constituted an
open and obvious danger. See, e.g., Steele v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 16 Utah 2d
127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-54 (1964). The district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Donahue-appeals, advancing several related
arguments. However, the dispositive issue on
appeal is whether the open and obvious danger
rule is an absolute bar to Donahue's action
under Utah's comparative negligence system.
We hold that even assuming the power line
was an open and obvious danger, Donahue is
nonetheless entitled to have the finder of fact
compare his negligence, if any, in encountering the power line with any negligence attributable to the defendants in creating or allowing such a dangerous condition to exist.
We first address this issue as it pertains to
Donahue's claim against DVF based on its
ownership of the warehouse.
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO
LANDOWNER LIABILITY
Historically, a landowner's duty of care
owing to persons entering his or her land
varied with the nature of the visit. See, e.g.,
Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah
1979). Bur see Williams v. Meiby, 699 P.2d
723, 726 (Utah 1985) (abandoning the traditional common law distinctions and instead
imposing a duty of "reasonable care in ail
circumstances," at least toward the landowner's tenant). Accord English v. Kienke, 114
P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gregory
v. Fourthwest
Invs.,
Ltd.,
754 P.2d
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89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Under the traditional view a landowner has no duty to warn
guests of "open and obvious dangers," regardless of the purpose of the visit. See, e.g.,
Ellertson v. Dansie, 576' P.2d 867, 868 (Utah
1978); Steele, 396 P.2d at 753-54. This doctrine is commonly known as the open and
obvious danger rule, and it precludes an
injured guest's recovery against the landowner
for any injuries sustained through encountering an obvious risk. The justification for the
rule appears to be that encountering an
obvious risk is negligence as a matter of law
and, at least under a contributory negligence
system, a plaintiff who is even only slightly
negligent is barred from recovery. An alternative justification is that while a landowner
has a duty to warn guests of dangers on his or
her property, the landowner's failure to do so
is harmless where the danger is readily apparent.
The open and obvious danger rule has been
sharply criticized. An often-cited basis for
attack is that the rule establishes the landowner's duty of care according to what is
known or should be known by the guest. See,
e.g., Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho
649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct. App. 1983), afPd
on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691
P.2d 1208 (1984). These critics argue that a
more logical approach treats the guest's knowledge of obvious danger as bearing only on
the reasonableness of the guest's subsequent
conduct, not as relieving the landowner of its
duty of care. See, e.g., Keller, 671 P.2d at
1117 (the open and obvious danger rule does
not differentiate between those facts relevant
to the landowner's duty of care and those
facts establishing a total or partial defense to
liability); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565
S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978) ("A plaintiffs
knowledge, whether it is derived from a
warning or from the facts, even if the facts
display the danger openly and obviously, is a
matter that bears upon [plaintiffs] own negligence; it should not affect the defendant's
duty.").
Others have criticized the open and obvious
danger rule for ignoring reality. As the Texas
Supreme Court observed,
[tjhere are many instances in which
a person of ordinary prudence may
prudently take a risk about which
he knows, or has been warned
about, or that is open and obvious
to him .... One's conduct after he
is possessed of full knowledge,
under the circumstances may be
justified or deemed negligent depending on such things as the plaintiffs status, the nature of the structure, the urgency or lack of it for
attempting to reach a destination,
the availability of an alternative,
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one's familiarity or lack of it with
the way, the degree and seriousness
of the danger, the availability of aid
from others, the nature and degree
of darkness, the kind and extent of
a warning, and the precautions
taken under the circumstances....
Farter, 565 S.W.2d at 520. See Keller, 671
P.2d at 1117. Courts subscribing to this view
have either completely abandoned the open
and obvious danger rule, as did Texas in Parker,
or, at a minimum, refuse to" apply the
rule as an absolute bar in actions brought by
plaintiffs who, like Donahue, entered the
property in connection with their employment
duties. See, e.g., Napoli v. Hellenic Lines,
Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 509 (2nd Cir. 1976) (a
vessel owner must anticipate that a longshoreman may voluntarily encounter an obvious
danger to avoid losing his job); Brown v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889, 892
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (where an employee's
duty renders an obvious danger unavoidable,
injured employee is not barred as a matter of
law from recovery against landowner); Shannon
v. Howard
S. Wright
Constr.
Co.,
181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438, 440-41 (1979)
(where an employee must either forego employment or encounter danger, the obviousness
of the danger will not completely bar the
employee's recovery for any resulting injury).
A related approach is articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Tons (1965). Section
343A provides that a landowner is not liable
for a guest's injuries resulting from an open
and obvious danger unless the landowner
"should anticipate the harm despite such
knowledge or obviousness." A few jurisdictions, apparently including Utah, have seen
merit in this approach. See, e.g., Whitman v.
W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d
918, 920 (1964) ("In order to justify holding
that a jury question as to negligence exists,
where injury has resulted from an observable
hazard, it is essential that there be something
which could be regarded as tending to distract
the [injured person's] attention or to prevent
him from seeing the danger ...."); Santos v.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480
(9th Cir. 1979) (applying Restatement approach under Jones Act), afVd, 451 U.S. 156
(1981); Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 491, 582 P.2d 300, 306
(1978) (a landowner may be liable for injuries
suffered by a worker encountering an obviously dangerous condition during periods of
foreseeable distraction).
Thus, the open and obvious danger rule is
not beyond reproach even within the contributory negligence system from which it arose.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
Utah has now abandoned its contributory
negligence system. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
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38 (1987), entitled "Comparative Negligence,"
provides in part that *[t]he fault of a person
seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery
by that person* He may recover from any
defendant or group of defendants whose fault
exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. §78-2737(2) defines "fault" as "any actionable breach
of legal duty ... including, but not limited to,
negligence in all its degrees, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, ...." We hold
that by enacting the above statutory provisions
and establishing a comparative negligence
system, the Utah Legislature has by necessary
implication abolished the open and obvious
danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured
guest's recovery. Our conclusion is premised*
on two grounds.
First, the open and obvious danger rule is
fundamentally incompatible with a comparative negligence scheme, which requires the
finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury
based on the relative responsibility of the
parties involved. The adoption of a comparative negligence system amounts to an expression by the Legislature that the harsh and
inflexible result of total victory or unconditional defeat compelled by the traditional contributory negligence system, including the open
and obvious danger rule, is no longer acceptable. As most convincingly articulated by
Judge Burnett for the Idaho Court of
Appeals,
[pjrior to the jidvent of comparative
negligence, contributory negligence
was an absolute bar to recovery.
Thus, it made little difference
whether a known or obvious condition excused a land possessor's
duty to an invitee, or simply insulated the possessor from liability for
any breach of such duty. But under
the comparative negligence system,
the difference is profound. If duty
is not excused by a known or
obvious danger, the injured invitee
might recover, albeit in a diminished amount, if his negligence in
encountering the risk is found to be
less than the land possessor's negligence in allowing the dangerous
condition or activity on his property. In contrast, if the invitee's
voluntary encounter with a known
or obvious danger were deemed to
excuse the landowner's duty, then
there would be no negligence to
c o m p a r e - - a n d , t h e r e f o r e , no
recovery. The effect would be to
resurrect contributory negligence as
an absolute bar to recovery in cases
involving a land possessor's liability
to invitees.
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1118-19. See also
O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278,
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1281-82 (Wyo. 1985). While the Idaho
Supreme Court did not immediately embrace
Judge Burnett's entire analysis, see Keller v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d
1208, 1210-11 (1984) (limiting the basis for
court of appeals holding), the court ultimately
adopted that view and abandoned the open
and obvious danger rule altogether, citing its
incompatibility with Idaho's comparative
negligence system. See Harrison v. Taylor, 115
Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1989). In
abandoning the traditional rule, the court
noted that *[w]e recognize the role stare
decisis plays in the judicial process. But we are
not hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doctrine ..'has proven over time to be unjust or
unwise." Id. at 1328. We are likewise convinced that the open and obvious danger rule is
incompatible with Utah's comparative negligence system and join Idaho and a number of
other states in announcing its abandonment.2
See, e.g., Cox v. J.C. Penney Co., 741
S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Woolston v.
Wells, 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984); Parker,
565 S.W.2d at 517; O'Donnell,
696
P.2d at 1284.
Our second point of analysis is premised
upon the fact that the assumption of risk
doctnne has been expressly abandoned in Utah
as a complete bar to recovery due to its incompatibility with our comparative negligence
system. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2)
(1987). See also Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981);*
Jacobsen
Constr.
Co. v.
Structo-Lite
Eng'g, Inc., 619 P 2d 306, 309 (Utah 1980). Accord Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746
P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It
would defy rationality to maintain the open
and obvious danger rule as a complete bar to
recovery where the essentially indistinguishable
assumption of risk doctnne no longer compels
such a result. See, e.g., Harrison, 768 P 2d at
1325 (open and obvious danger rule is a corollary to the assumption of risk doctnne and
should likewise be abandoned); Parker, 565
S.W.2d at 518 (assumption of risk doctrine is
inseparable from the open and obvious danger
rule). See also Utah Code Ann. §78-2737(2) (1987) (defining "fault" for purposes of
the comparative negligence scheme as including "assumption of risk" and "negligence in
all its degrees").
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has
interpreted section 78-27-37(2) to abolish
the last clear chance doctnne as a complete
bar to recovery.
It is widely recognized that such
doctnnes as assumption of risk, last
clear chance, and discovered peril
resemble the old contributory negligence doctrine in that they are "ail
or nothing" doctrines in terms of
recovery by the plaintiff ...
UTAH
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(T]here seem to be no good
reasons to retain [the last clear
chance] doctnne which was onginaily devised because of another
doctrine, i.e., contnbutory negligence, which the state of Utah has
statutonly abolished as an absolute
bar to recovery.
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah
1982) (emphasis added). We likewise find no
good reasons to retain the open and obvious
danger rule as an absolute bar to recovery.
The summary judgment against Donahue and
in favor of DVF must accordingly be reversed.4
JUDGMENT AGAINST OTHER
DEFENDANTS
Lastly, we address the summary judgment in
favor of Durfee and Howell. Donahue's claim
against these two defendants is based on their
roles in procunng and supervising the construction of the DVF warehouse, including allowing the active power line to remain so near
the warehouse roof while Donahue worked.
Apparently, the only basis for summary judgment in their favor was the open and obvious
nature of the danger posed by the power line.
As we held above, the mere obviousness of
danger does not support summary judgment
under these facts, and it must also be reversed
as to both Durfee and Howell.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the summary judgment and
remand this matter for tnal or such other
proceedings as may be appropnate consistent
with this opinion. At tnal, the finder of fact
must compare the reasonableness of
Donahue's conduct under all the circumstances in encountenng the power line with the
reasonableness of DVF's, Durfee's, and
Howell's conduct in creating and allowing the
potentially deadly power line to remain so
near the warehouse roof, in an activated state,
while work was being done on the roof. If any
damages are warranted under this analysis,
they must be awarded consistent with Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1987), as discussed
above. The parties will bear their own costs of
this appeal.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. Donahue entered into settlements with ABCO and
Utah Power and Light, and they are not parties to
this appeal.
2. The middle ground taken by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Keller, namely that ot recognizing an exception for injured employees rather than rejecting
outright the open and obvious danger doctnne, is
not without attraction as a more cautious and conservative approach to the law's development.
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However, there is no defensible basis for making
such fine distinctions in view of our conclusion that
the open and obvious danger rule, at least as a total
bar to liability, has been legislatively washed away
with the enactment in this state of a comparative
negligence scheme. And as discussed in the text, the
Idaho court reached this very conclusion in Harrison
only five years after its decision in Keller.
3. In Moore, 631 P.2d at 868, the Utah Supreme
Court also held the defendant landowner was entitled to a jury instruction that he has no duty to
warn a business invitee of an obvious danger, but
the failure to give such an instruction under the
particular facts was held to be harmless error. This
result does cast doubt on the propriety of our conclusion here. While our Supreme Court recognized
in Moore that the assumption of risk doctrine has
been abandoned as a complete bar to recovery under
sections 78-27-37 and-38, it failed to consider
the effect of those provisions on the open and
obvious danger rule, most likely because that point
was not argued by the panics. 631 P.2d at 870. We
believe that had the parties in Moore analyzed the
open and obvious danger rule in this light, the
Court would have held that there are no significant
differences between it and the assumption of risk
doctrine, abandoning both under our comparative
negligence system.
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt narrow
somewhat the range of cases involving landowner
liability in which summary judgment will be appropriate. However, summary judgment will still be
available, even though the landowner will be unable
to take refuge behind the open and obvious danger
doctrine, in situations where the landowner establishes undisputed facts showing he was not negligent
as a matter of law. Such situations include plaintiffs
who are solely responsible for creating the dangerous condition on defendant's land. E.g., English v.
Kicnkc, 774 P.2d 1154,1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Th)is matter is before the court on three
motions for summary disposition: the court's
sua sponte motion, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's motion and the Workers' Compensation Fund's motion. The Employers'
Reinsurance Fund and the Workers' -Compensation Fund both move to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that it was not timely filed.
Petitioner concedes that the appeal should be
dismissed, but urges the court to dismiss the
appeal due to lack of a final order.
The Industrial Commission's order from
which this appeal is taken adopts the Administrative Law Judge's (A.L.J.) findings of fact
but remands for a determination of whether
petitioner should receive his medical expenses
relating to his 1985 injury. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether the Commission's order is
a final appealable order.
Generally, "[a)n appeal can be taken only
from entry of a final judgment which wholly
disposes of a claim against a party." Hase v.
Hase, 775 P.2d 943, 944 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14 (Supp.
1988) provides that an aggrieved party may
obtain judicial review of final agency action,
except in actions where judicial review is
expressly prohibited by statute. The statute
further states that a party may seek judicial
review only after exhausting all administrative
remedies and shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action. Utah Code Ann.
§§63-46b-14(2)&(3).
In several jurisdictions courts have recognized that generally remand orders in administrative proceedings are not final appealable
orders.11 We agree that an order of the agency
is not final so long as it reserves something to
the agency for further decision. See Maryland
Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore
Gas & Elcc., 296 Md. 46, 459 A.2d 205, 21213 (1983); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Strait,
673 S.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
The order in the present case remands to the
A.L.J, for a determination of whether petitioner should receive his medical expenses relating to his 1985 injury. Because the order
reserves something further for the agency to
determine, we hold that the order of the
Commission is not a final appealable order.
Consequently, we dismiss the appeal due to
lack of junsdiction in accordance with R.
Utah Ct. App. 10(a)(1). Because we dismiss
the appeal due to lack of a final order, we

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

